Gender and conflict in the Middle East - An interview with Nadje Al-Ali by Stockmarr, Leila
 1 
Interview with Professor of gender studies Nadje Al-Ali, SOAS, University of 
London 
 
Leila Stockmarr (LS): I wish to open with by using a quote from one of your 
lectures on women in the Middle East “the louder a President will shout women’s 
rights in the Middle East, the more conservative backlash your will have against 
women’s rights in the region or anywhere in the world”. What do you mean by 
that?  
 
Nadje Al-Ali (NAA): I mean that the recent dynamics especially since 9/11 
between western countries and particularly Middle Eastern countries more so 
than in the rest of the world, is very much defined in terms of- us-versus-them. 
Here women’s sexuality, women’s bodies, and statistics relating to women’s 
education and so on, are being used as a benchmark to demarcate the west 
against the “uncivilized” Middle East and the Muslim world. Unfortunately, I 
think that was very evident during President Bush’ presidency; if you have a 
president shouting for women’s rights while invading in the Middle East 
militarily the resistance to western imperialism and the resistance to 
imperialistic encroachment will also be articulated in terms of gender relations, 
women’s bodies and so on. People, who under different circumstances would not 
be opposed to issues like women’s education, labor force participation and dress 
codes take up enter more conservative ways of thinking, because these markers 
of difference have become so central in this struggle of east versus west- the 
Muslim and the western world. This creates a stronger backlash for women. We 
have seen it very clearly in Iraq and Afghanistan but also other places in the 
region. 
 
Q: You have described this link between international interventions and conflicts 
and then women’s situations, as having a negative impact on women’s rights. Could 
you be more specific and explain that link as you’ve done in your work on Iraq, 
Afghanistan and Palestine? 
 
In the Palestinian context it is very clear that more the west in perceived to be 
supportive of Israel, Israeli foreign policy and occupation, the more there will be 
resistance to western cultural encroachment. Women are sort of symbolically 
marking these boundaries between cultures and communities. So the turn 
towards greater social conservatisms and more conservative gender norms in 
Palestine, are very much linked to the occupation and anti-imperial policies and 
sentiments. The same in the Iraqi context where both the Iraqi government but 
also the resistance to the occupation very much used gender relations and 
women’s issues politically. In the Iraqi context it is complicated because there 
were both the challenges of the old marker of difference of the previous regime 
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that was seen to more progressive and secular as women were concerned and at 
the same time the resistance was very much trying to act against western 
imperialism, invasion. 
 
LS: Why do you argue that gender relations are used by external powers to 
legitimize intervention?  
 
NAA: It was most obvious in the Afghani context where a major reason for the 
justification for the war was to liberate Afghani women. It was very clear that 
women were used to justify military invasion. In the Iraqi context there were a 
lot women’s rights activists who let themselves be co-opted by the Bush 
Administration; it started already in 2001 where there were all these projects 
funded by the US State Department addressing the issue of women’s rights under 
Saddam Hussein, and how the regime was violating women’s rights. This was 
used to justify the invasion.  In that perspective, I think one should question, why 
in all those years before the US State Department was not interested in women’s 
rights and human rights in Iraq but all of a sudden they were?  
When I interviewed some of the Iraqi women who had been based in the United 
States for longer periods of time, and the way they had spoke about the Ba’ath 
regime, and of course the regime was horrible in terms of human rights abuses, 
but there was quite a bit of propaganda in this portraying of a country in which 
women are all oppressed. It was just so much nuanced than that. 
 
LS: Is this, the use of women’s rights to justify different kinds of interventions a new 
phenomenon? Is it particular in the context of the Middle East? 
 
NAA: No, I think it has a long history. If you look at colonial history you have 
similar things happening. Spivak’s notion of “white men saving brown women 
from brown men” has a long history, but I think that it has been intensified in the 
post 9/11 era, and we are seeing trends similar to colonial times with the 
rhetoric of bringing civilization to “uncivilized countries” with oppressed 
women. 
 
LS: What are donor communities, progressive NGO’s to do in this context if they are 
to work abroad in Iraq and Afghanistan? 
 
NAA: They have to work in an intersectional manner. They have to do their 
homework and get into alliances with local women’s organizations but most 
importantly look at women’s issues intersectionally by also looking at the impact 
of occupation and the impact of neo-liberal policies. I could never have done my 
work in Iraq without having done it this way. 
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LS: How do you, in your research maneuver between different categories such as 
gender, class, and ethnicity – is gender a specific category or marker of difference 
equal to other “categories”? 
  
NAA: One marker of difference is constituted by the other. Maybe in some 
context some markers of inequality are more significant than others. I think 
there is no one answer; people need to do their homework and understand the 
context. For example in Iraq; maybe religion at the height of the sectarian 
tensions and violent conflict, was a more significant marker than gender, but 
even then religion clearly intersected with gender; the things you experience as a 
Sunni/Shia woman were different from the ones experienced by a Sunni/Shia 
man. In some contexts then religion or class or “being exposed to an occupation” 
might be secondary. The specifics of a context are crucial, and these might 
change over time. They are not static. Right now it is very much the occupation in 
Iraq and authoritarianism especially in the Middle East that seem to be 
important. In my research I look at the underlying structures and I look at 
patriarchy. But I cannot look at patriarchy and gender relations in the Middle 
Easts right now without looking at wider structures of political authoritarianism 
and how they intersect with patriarchy, combined with a look at how that 
intersects with political economies. 
 
LS: In your book “What Kind of Liberation” you reject cultural explanations to 
gender-relations giving special credence to Islam and other cultural 
particularities? How do you then deal with cultural aspects? 
 
NAA: Of course there is culture and it matters. What I argue, is that cultures are 
not static they are changing. Culture is always subject to change depending on 
political economy. And it’s always quite diverse; in a country like Iraq there are 
huge differences in terms of attitudes, customs, traditions depending on class, 
depending on where you live. As I try to write in my book “Iraqi women: Untold 
Stories from 1948 to the Present”, there were specific historical moments where 
specific political economies opened up spaces and opportunities for women/ For 
example, in the 1970’s in Iraq, women were pushed into the education sector 
and the labor force. This was very different from the 1990’s when sanctions 
marginalized women, as there was very little employment and little money.  A 
phenomenon like polygamy increased in Iraq because of demographic changes 
not because of some inherent cultural element. 
However, I am not an economic determinist. I am an anthropologist, and 
interested in culture, but I argue that people’s perception of culture is not static 
and does not exist in a vacuum. 
 
LS: Most of your research is on women? Don’t you see a need to incorporate 
perspective on masculinities into the analytical equation in order to understand the 
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gendered processes as a connected relational system? In your research, how do you 
deal with these two categories? 
 
NAA: Definitely, this is very important. And I did actually come to a point a few 
years ago where I felt that I can’t possible understand what is happening to 
women, if I don’t study men and masculinity as well. Especially in a context like 
Iraq: how have men and masculinities been affected by dictatorship, sanctions 
and invasion, fleeing the country, violence and sectarianism. I did start a pilot 
study and I just found myself unable to continue. After writing “What Kind of 
Liberation” I was very personally affected by what had happened in Iraq, and 
didn’t have the stamina to do an in-depth study on Iraqi men. I think that this 
should be done. I started at a place where women were non-existing in any kind 
of official history, so that was my starting point; trying to insert women back into 
the picture. As a feminist, I am really committed to women’s rights but I do think 
that for too long masculinities have not been problematized in a proper manner. 
In terms of future research, I have decided that I would like to do research on 
‘love’ focusing on Palestine and Iraq. I think that it will be a good way to combine 
masculinity with femininity from an analytically original perspective. Also I 
wanted to move away from looking at Iraq and Palestine merely through the lens 
of war and violence. Love is a very interesting analytical lens as it opens up to 




LS: What role should women play in national mobilization strategies as we have 
seen them unfold during the last two years of Arab Spring? 
 
NAA: It’s very tricky and a long debate in feminist circles after the Egyptian 
revolution. Looking at the literature my starting point was that national 
liberation and women’s liberation don’t really work hand in hand; yes there are 
certain historical moments where national liberation opens up political spaces 
but then gives priority to a range of wider issues of national liberation and 
women’s rights are pushed aside. I think historically, having worked on Iraqi 
Kurdistan and talked to people in Palestine, where you have people who are 
without a state struggling for national liberation. I think it is really not possible 
for us, especially us in the West, to be judgmental about women’s nationalist 
mobilization. It doesn’t make sense for Palestinian women’s rights activists not 
also to be involved in broader national struggles as well. The question is one of 
emphasis; historically and cross-culturally the idea that “let’s get the bigger 
struggle sorted and then look at women’s rights” is just unrealistic. We’ve just 
been hit over the head so many times. We always have to put demands for 
women’s rights at the front. What Nicola Pratt and myself argue in the book 
Women and war in the Middle East: Transnational Perspectives is that when you 
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look at the relationship between nationalism and feminism – national liberation 
and women’s liberation, we really have to ask the question, and be empirically 
historically specific: What kind of nationalism? And what kind of feminism are 
we talking about? Because they intersect in very different ways. Are we speaking 
about a right wing exclusive nationalism? Or are we talking about an anti-
colonial inclusive nationalism? Are we talking about an imperial feminism, or are 
we talking about a liberal feminism that is just talking about rights but not 
political and economic issues?  Are we speaking about post-colonial feminism? 
We need to be very careful as to how we use these concepts, and in addition to 
the fact that temporalities are also very important. At which stage of a national 
struggle, and at which stage of women’s struggle do these two intersect? If we for 
example take Palestine and Iraqi Kurdistan there were historical moments when 
the national liberation struggles opened up space for women. But the moment 
these struggles were institutionalized, as happened in Palestine and Iraqi 
Kurdistan, we’ve seen shifts towards more conservative gender norms and 
relations. 
 
LS: In Egypt what should women have done not to sideline their demands on behalf 
of national revolution? 
 
NAA: This is of course not for me to judge. But certainly what I found disturbing 
myself, was that in the very beginning many women said: we are not here as 
women but as Egyptians and citizens. I understand this, and perhaps there was 
momentarily this space that were markers of difference; gender and class was 
not as significant anymore, and it wasn’t very important to stress this. But now 
there are so many obstacles. More than me saying, “they should have put it on 
the table earlier on”, I think when looking at the current situation I think that 
coalitions and broader based international alliances would have been useful, as 
the Egyptians women’s movements like other places in the world today is caught 
up in rivalry and competitions. 
 
LS: Many of the contributions of this journal deal with the challenges of 
implementing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325. What are the 
ambiguities and inherited problems of that resolution? 
 
NAA: It’s very problematic but we can’t really let go because we don’t have much 
else. The problem in the context of Iraq and Palestine is that in the Palestinian 
case none of the UN resolutions have really been implemented. So there is a kind 
of double standard and hypocrisy in Israel not following UN resolutions, and that 
really the UN has not really been helpful in terms of solving the political 
problems. In the Iraqi context, it was the UN that was actually managing the 
sanctions regime for 13 years, which caused the death of many thousands of 
Iraqi children and widespread poverty.  So there are quite a lot of discrediting of 
 6 
the UN in these contexts. So that is of course very problematic to use resolutions 
as a tool. Having said that, I do know that there are women’s rights activists that 
are trying to use resolution 1325 to put pressure on Iraqi politicians, because it 
is one of the few tools that they have. We need to be critical and recognize the 
limitation but at the same time, we can’t just totally dismiss them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
